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AMERICAN COURTS’ IMAGE OF A TENANT
Nadav Shoked
ABSTRACT—What is the core of current American residential landlord–
tenant law, and how was that core formed? This Essay argues that in the past
few decades courts have settled on a two-pronged landlord–tenant law
regime. The law provides tenants with assurances respecting the quality of
the units they rent. It does not, conversely, provide them with any assurances
respecting the price of the rental units—and, therefore, respecting their
ability to remain in those units.
The first component of the regime was established through the wellknown judicial creation and endorsement of the warranty of habitability. The
second component’s entrenchment is often attributed to legislative reforms
that rejected rent control. In fact, however, courts played a major role in
instating this component as well. Through a heretofore largely ignored resort
to multiple local government law doctrines, courts have consistently rejected
municipal measures aimed at regulating the pricing of rental units.
This prevalent distinction courts have instituted between quality
controls (which they require) and price controls (which they reject) cannot
be justified in traditional economic terms. The academic literature does not
support the contention that one measure is more effective in aiding poor
tenants than the other. The current regime can hardly be viewed, therefore,
as geared toward redistribution and fairness. Rather, this Essay argues, the
distinction between quality and price controls that characterizes American
landlord–tenant law serves to operationalize a certain view of the meaning
of tenancy in modern times. Courts engaged in what they perceived as a
traditional common law exercise of updating the contours of the landlord–
tenant legal relationship. In doing so, they were inspired by, and then
implemented, an image of the new urban tenant as requiring—and
expecting—certain amenities and rights. Importantly, this image of the
modern tenant was general and class neutral. It thus lent support to measures
benefitting—at least theoretically—all tenants, but not to those explicitly,
and exclusively, focused on poor tenants.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of
Law. This Essay was part of the Northwestern University Law Review 2021
Symposium, Reimagining Property in the Era of Inequality, and I am
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INTRODUCTION
Modern landlord–tenant law came to embody 1960s hopes that reforms
to law, and especially property law, could be tools in fighting poverty and
inequality.1 Property law was never an obvious vehicle for such a fight
against inequality. Property law’s main concern is those who hold property.
Thus, most of its doctrines can, if at all, only help the have-nots on the
margins: for example, exceptions to the trespass tort—which is all about
protecting the haves—could be somewhat expanded, thereby aiding,
indirectly and in very specific circumstances, the homeless. Landlord–tenant
law is different. It is the one domain within property law that centers directly,
wholly, and explicitly on regulating the relationship between actors who are
normally the haves, landlords, and actors who are often the have-nots,
tenants. Reformers in the 1960s—that unique decade when a complete
overhaul of America’s inequities appeared attainable—thus zeroed in on
strengthening the rights of the residential tenant.2 Those rights were to be the
one effective tool within property law to address the harms of inequality,
which property law otherwise sustains.
The ensuing campaign to bolster the legal rights of tenants vis-à-vis
landlords was, in many ways, successful. It is a mainstay of reviews of
American law in the field to note that the past half-century represented a
revolution in landlord–tenant law.3

1
A famous article launching the use of civil litigation to advance the war on poverty—which then
led to the founding of Legal Aid Services through LBJ’s Great Society—is Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C.
Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1334 (1964).
2
See, e.g., THEA K. FLAUM & ELIZABETH C. SALZMAN, THE TENANT’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3–4,
16–18 (1969).
3
E.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. Rev.
503, 503 (1982) (“It is generally acknowledged that the 1960’s and 1970’s saw a revolution of sorts in
American landlord-tenant law . . . .”).
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More than fifty years later, and in the midst of a New Gilded Age
characterized by inequality levels the instigators of the revolution could
never have imagined,4 I would like to assess what that revolution has done
to landlord–tenant law—and also what it has failed to do. The postrevolutionary settlement, I will argue, revolves around a specific
understanding of the rights attached to a residential lease. A lease of a
residential unit must be accompanied by an assurance of quality—but by no
assurance of price, and thus of stability. A tenant in current American law
has a right, which she can enforce in court, that the unit she inhabits
consistently meet minimal standards of habitability. She has no similar right
that the landlord provide that unit for a specific rent, or refrain from
increasing the current rent.
The route the law took toward establishing the first component of this
regime—the assurance of quality—is well-known. Starting with the D.C.
Circuit’s groundbreaking decision in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
courts established a requirement that a leased unit abide by certain minimal
standards of habitability.5 Judges, that is, led the charge in establishing this
component of the law.
Conversely, according to common wisdom, judges played a secondary
role in establishing the second component of the post-revolutionary
landlord–tenant regime—the denial of price assurances. Rent control was
felled by state legislatures that enacted laws banning local rent control
measures. In this context, it is often noted that for more than a century,
judges, for their part, have consistently refused to strike down rent control
measures as violating the Federal Constitution’s Takings Clause. This view
of judges as assuming an accommodating, or at least neutral, stance toward
rent control is somewhat misleading, however. In actuality, through an array
of state common law doctrines, state courts undermined rent control for
years, and once legislative bans were enacted, gave these bans extremely
broad readings. Thus, both components of modern low-income landlord–
tenant law should be analyzed as largely—albeit not solely—judicial
creations.
But on what grounds did the judiciary create these doctrines of
landlord–tenant law? What motivated judges to embrace quality controls but
deny price controls? To, that is, trust the market to efficiently set rental units’
pricing but then doubt its ability to efficiently assure those units’ quality?
This two-pronged move hardly reflects accepted prescriptions for good
policy. The academic literature on the law and economics of low-income
4
The most influential work on the current plight and exploitation of poor tenants is, unquestionably,
MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).
5
428 F.2d 1071, 1072–74 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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housing does not unanimously embrace the warranty of habitability as an
effective means to promote the interests of low-income tenants. Nor does the
literature share the unyielding view of rent control as antithetical (though it
is clearly sympathetic to this second component of the judicial formula). The
academic literature simply does not perceive the clear demarcation between
the efficacy and desirability of quality controls and price controls which the
law has insisted on.
The structure of the law that American courts have constructed for lowincome housing is thus not necessarily grounded in considerations of
efficiency. Rather, I will argue here, it was built on traditional legal notions
respecting tenancy as courts updated those notions through the application
of (what courts viewed as) common law methods. The resulting structure
reflects courts’ perception of what tenancy, as a legal concept, means. The
rules courts announced attempted to give concrete substance to a certain
specific image of a tenant. The regime they generated, therefore, is not rooted
in a desire to effectively combat inequality or redistribute wealth. Instead, it
expresses an income- or class-neutral idea of tenancy and a desire to abide
(or at least pretend to abide) by old common law conventions.
The goal of this brief Essay, therefore, is rather limited. I do not
endeavor to make here a normative contribution. The Essay purports to break
no new ground in justifying—or negating—the desirability of the warranty
of habitability, rent control, or any measure in landlord–tenant law.
Similarly, it offers no prescriptions respecting ways to better the law. Indeed,
this is, explicitly, an exploration of the law on the books rather than in action;
thus, it makes no claims about the extent to which the implied warranty of
habitability and, when available, rent control have actually been meaningful
legal interventions. While the main thrust is to explicate existing law, even
this aspiration has its limits. It would be too pretentious to contend that I (or
for that matter, anyone else) can definitively explain why various American
judges made certain choices in diverse decisions in disparate cases. But I can
describe those choices, highlight the contradictions they embody, and
suggest potential concerns that could have animated them. The goal is to
craft a new—and I hope both interesting and helpful—lens through which
readers can observe elements of the law they already know well.
Accordingly, Part I presents the current structure of the law. It traces
the well-known role of courts in reforming landlords’ maintenance duties
and also the much less well-known role of courts in sabotaging efforts at rent
control. Part II attempts to explain this current structure. It provides a review
of the legal and economic literature, concluding that the literature does not
find a stark difference between the effects of quality and price controls on
low-income housing. The judicial attitude insisting on the distinction
255
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between the two is then attributed not to a concern with efficiency—or
equality—but to a certain image of the modern tenant which, importantly, is
class and race neutral.
This exploration of the way courts established key components of
modern landlord–tenant law and their motivations in doing so aids in
explicating the state of this important body of law. More generally, it also
helps in assessing the potential for combating property inequality through
common law courts. Based on the story told here, little reason exists for
much optimism respecting that potential. Efforts at meaningful reform
should focus on other arenas.
I.

COURTS AND THE LANDLORD–TENANT REVOLUTION

At common law, a tenant’s rights were harshly limited. Into the second
half of the twentieth century, the law viewed the lease as a grant of an
estate—originally, a nonfreehold estate6—and thus it placed few obligations
on the grantor landlord. The landlord only had to transfer the estate; that is,
a formal right to the specific property for the defined period.7 Once she did
that, her obligations mostly ceased.8 The radically anti-tenant nature of this
view is perhaps easiest to grasp through one of its most extreme
ramifications. If, following the signing of the lease, a tenant could not enter
the leased land because a wrongful possessor was occupying it (for example,
a former tenant who refused to leave), most American courts would have
found no claim in the tenant against the landlord.9 The tenant would have
needed to evict the occupant herself. After all, with the lease a mere
conveyance of title, the landlord was only obligated to transfer a formal right
to possess the land, not to deliver actual possession.10
The legal status of the tenancy as a transfer of an estate—and nothing
beyond that—left the regulation of the relationship between the landlord and
tenant to the lease alone. Freedom of contract reigned supreme. But even that
statement underappreciates the landlord’s legal powers in traditional law. For
the lease was not actually subject to contract law doctrines that normally
generate obligations for both contracting parties, thereby somewhat capping

6
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 38, 111 (2d ed., Liberty Fund 2010) (1898).
7
ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1:1, at 1–3 (1980).
8
Milton R. Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 165, 166 (1947).
9
1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 182, at
1147–54 (1910).
10
Id. at 1154. In England, and a number of American states, the landlord had to deliver actual
possession. See Teitelbaum v. Direct Realty Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887–88 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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the powers of the stronger party to the transaction.11 Because the lease itself
was viewed as a conveyance of property rather than a contract, duties
sounding in contract law—such as the duty of good faith12 or the duty to
mitigate damages13—did not burden the landlord.
This conception of tenancy, originating in the common law’s medieval
days and granting the tenant no rights beyond those she bargained for, grew
less and less adequate as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries progressed.
By the late nineteenth century, industrialization, immigration, and
urbanization had transformed the market for housing, especially in major
cities.14 The plight of tenement dwellers became a major cause for reformers,
and then for some state legislatures, in the Progressive Era.15 In the aftermath
of the New Deal, and even more meaningfully, following World War II, the
federal government poured resources into efforts at improving living
conditions.16 Around the same time, often prodded by activists and
commentators,17 courts also began questioning the tenets of the old common
law of landlord–tenant18—about which Justice Holmes was still noting, as
late as 1918, that “it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke.”19
Judges thus proceeded to usher in the revolution in landlord–tenant law.

11
Also, and importantly, the contract doctrine of mutual dependence of promises, developed in the
late eighteenth century, was not imported into the law governing leases. Glendon, supra note 3, at 511.
This doctrine would have allowed a tenant to renege on her promise to pay rent if a landlord breached
any of his promises in the lease.
12
E.g., Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844, 847 (Cal. 1985) (explaining that
traditionally, courts did not apply the good faith requirements to consent clauses in leases).
13
Heckel v. Griese, 171 A. 148, 149 (N.J. 1934).
14
See generally JONATHAN LEVY, AGES OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 243–49 (2021) (discussing industrialization and the growth of cities). Urban population jumped
from 6.2 million in 1860 to 30 million in 1900. Id. at 248.
15
The first such law was the New York Tenement House Law of 1867, 1867 N.Y. Laws, ch. 908,
§§ 1–19, applicable only to New York City. It was almost immediately followed by a Massachusetts law
that applied to Boston. 1868 Mass. Acts, ch. 281, §§ 1–18. On the reform movement supporting these
efforts, see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF
FRUSTRATION 38–41 (Morton Grodzins ed., 1968) (discussing the housing reform movement that
emerged in the Progressive Era and targeted “evil” landlords exploiting “ignorant” tenants).
16
E.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949) (declaring that “the
general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require . . . the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family”); Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 220(a), 68 Stat. 590, 596 (1954)
(broadening the New Deal Era’s “slum clearance” into “urban renewal” programs).
17
See, e.g., FLAUM & SALZMAN, supra note 2, at 16–18 (describing contemporary housing shortages
and ensuing tenants’ actions in the battle for reform).
18
2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.08[2][e] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2007) (noting that starting in the 1950s and 1960s courts allowed tenant tort claims against landlords for
breach of housing codes).
19
Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918).
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This Part will first review what that revolution achieved, focusing on
the judicial embrace of the implied warranty of habitability, and then turn to
what it did not achieve, focusing on entrenched judicial opposition to rent
control.
A. A Strong Judicial “Yes” to Quality Controls
Courts’ abandonment of the old common law’s notion of the lease as
mere conveyance of an estate led to the reversal of the most extreme
ramifications of that traditional conception, such as those noted above
respecting the landlord’s lack of obligation to deliver actual possession or to
mitigate damages.20 But unquestionably, the most dramatic element of the
revolution in landlord–tenant law was the imposition on the landlord of a
duty to maintain the unit she leased to the tenant.
The old common law had no such duty. With the lease seen as mere
conveyance, the notion of caveat lessee governed.21 Unless the lease stated
otherwise, the leased premises had to meet no quality standards.22 An oftcited and, to modern eyes, shocking illustration is the decision of a court to
mandate that a tenant pay rent even after the building she leased had burned
down.23
The common law did recognize one doctrine that seemingly had some
relevance and aided tenants: the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Because the
lease was a conveyance of the right of possession, the landlord was
prohibited from interfering with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of her
possession. Such interference would undermine—indeed, negate—the

20

Forty-two states and D.C. now impose a duty to mitigate damages. Austin Hill Country Realty,
Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. 1997). Also see an 1860 New York statute that
provided:
[T]he lessees or occupants of any building, which shall, without any fault or neglect on their part,
be destroyed or be so injured by the elements or any other cause as to be untenantable and unfit
for occupancy, shall not be liable or bound to pay rent to the lessors or owners thereof, after such
destruction or injury.
Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 453 (1873).
21
Franklin v. Brown, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (N.Y. 1889) (“It is uniformly held in this state that the lessee
of real property must run the risk of its condition, unless he has an express agreement on the part of the
lessor covering that subject. As was said by the learned General Term when deciding this case: ‘The
tenant hires at his peril and a rule similar to that of caveat emptor applies and throws on the lessee the
responsibility of examining as to the existence of defects in the premises and of providing against their
ill effects.’”).
22
As late as 1965, a major treatise could proclaim: “In the absence of statute, and in the absence of
a controlling covenant, a lessor is not under a duty to maintain leased land in a state of repair.” W ILLIAM
E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 64 (3d ed. 1965).
23
White v. Molyneux, 2 Ga. 124, 126 (1847).
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transaction.24 A landlord’s interference with quiet possession could take the
most obvious form: actual eviction—physical exclusion of the tenant from
all or part of the premises.25 But by the mid-nineteenth century, courts
decided that an eviction need not be actual.26 If a landlord created
circumstances rendering the property unfit for possession, the tenant could
demonstrate an eviction by construction of the law.27 Forced to leave due to
landlord-created circumstances, the tenant would be viewed by a court as
evicted—in violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.28
To meet the requirements of a claim under the covenant, the tenant had
to be able to show that the unit was rendered wholly unlivable and, as a
precondition for this claim that the unit was now unlivable, leave the unit
and renounce possession.29 These elements reflected the doctrine’s logic that
the landlord should only become liable if she evicted a tenant during the lease
period. But these elements also harshly curtailed the doctrine’s reach. It
24

Metropole Const. Co. v. Hartigan, 85 A. 313, 314 (N.J. 1912). In earlier times, rent payments
under the feudal system were based upon the theory that productive use of the land was necessary to
produce the rent. Therefore, if the landlord directly or indirectly deprived the tenant of the use of any part
of the land, rent payments were suspended until the landlord removed the obstacle. Id. In this respect,
courts’ perception of the lease as the conveyance of an estate could work in favor of the tenant. If the
landlord merely partially evicted the tenant (removed her from only part of the premises), the tenant could
stop paying rent entirely while staying in the remaining portions. It was irrelevant that the space to which
the tenant had been deprived of access was relatively small or unimportant to her use and enjoyment of
the premises. It merely had to be “[o]utside the rule de minimis.” Smith v. McEnany, 48 N.E. 781, 781–
82 (Mass. 1897).
25
Smith, 48 N.E. at 781. Additionally:
This rule of the common law is inflexible. For rent which by the terms of the demise would accrue
during the continuance of the eviction the landlord can neither sue, nor can he distrain for the rent
reserved, or any part of it; nor can he recover for use and occupation, although in either case the
tenant has continued in possession of the remaining part of the premises demised.
Morris v. Kettle, 30 A. 879, 880 (N.J. 1895).
26
Townsend v. Gilsey, 7 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 59, 63 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1869) (“Anciently, nothing short of
an actual expulsion operated an eviction; but, in modern times the rule has been liberalized in favor of
the tenant; and now any intentional and injurious interference by the landlord with the beneficial
enjoyment of the premises will discharge the tenant from his obligation for the rent.”).
27
The American case announcing the rule was Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 727 (N.Y. 1826),
where the landlord habitually brought “lewd women under the same roof with the demised premises . . .
by which nocturnal noise and disturbance were made; and, in consequence, the lessee quitted the premises
and remained away, with his family.” This, the court held, should bar the landlord from collecting rent,
“the same as on an actual or physical entry and expulsion of the tenant.” Id.
28
The leading English case on constructive eviction was Upton v. Greenlees, 139 Eng. Rep. 986,
994 (1855) (defining a constructive eviction as “an act of a permanent character done by the landlord in
order to deprive, and which had the effect of depriving, the tenant of the use of the thing demised, or of a
part of it”).
29
“A tenant cannot claim uninhabitability, and at the same time continue to inhabit.” Two Rector St.
Corp. v. Bein, 234 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (App. Div. 1929). SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 7, § 3:5, at 97 (explaining
that to be tantamount to an eviction, the landlord’s acts must be “so injurious to the tenant’s enjoyment
and use of the property as to justify abandonment by the tenant.”).
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could provide very little help to tenants in substandard housing units.
Particularly the demand that the tenant abandon the unit for any claim to be
considered—“we know of no case sustaining the doctrine that there can be a
constructive eviction, without a surrender of the possession”30—rendered the
doctrine almost wholly useless for poor tenants, whose housing options were
limited, if not nonexistent. Furthermore, as a doctrine which low-income
tenants could hardly enforce, the covenant of quiet enjoyment could carry no
meaningful deterrent effect and did not incentivize landlords to maintain
units they were renting out.
Against this background in 1970, the D.C. Circuit introduced the
implied warranty of habitability.31 In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
tenants in a Washington, D.C. slum stopped paying rent after their landlord
had failed to fix hundreds of housing code violations.32 In one of the most
famous property law decisions authored by an American jurist, Judge J.
Skelly Wright denied the landlord’s eviction action for nonpayment of rent.
He held that all leaseholds signed in the city must be read as containing a
landlord promise to abide by the city’s housing code.33 Further, he insisted
that a tenant’s obligation under the lease to pay rent was dependent upon this
implied obligation to comply with the code the landlord had assumed under
the same lease.34 These two moves established a “warranty of habitability.”35
The warranty placed on the landlord a meaningful maintenance duty
that tenants could effectively enforce. To rely on the Javins-announced
warranty, a tenant need not have left her unit; indeed, she need not even have
turned to a court. She could just stop paying rent and then raise the warranty
as a defense to a landlord’s eviction claim.
State and local legislatures had been enacting and refining housing
codes and tenement laws since the Progressive Era.36 The tight resources of
governmental enforcement agencies had always, perhaps inevitably,

30

Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N.Y. 293, 297 (1882).
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Arguably, courts in
Hawaii and Wisconsin had done so earlier. Wisconsin’s highest court introduced the warranty in Pines v.
Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Wis. 1961). However, the case was, at least one commentator argued,
overruled sub silentio by Posnanski v. Hood, 174 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Wis. 1970). See Roger A.
Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From
Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 8 n.14, 9 n.25 (1979). And in Hawaii, Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d
470, 472–74 (Haw. 1969), decided a year before Javins, engaged in full discussion of the existing law
and reasons to reform it.
32
428 F.2d at 1073.
33
Id. at 1081–82.
34
Id. at 1082.
35
Id. at 1072–73.
36
See supra note 15.
31
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suppressed those measures’ effects.37 The warranty of habitability could
transform these measures’ promise into a reality. Withholding rent made it
easy for tenants to force their landlord to make the repairs necessary under
the applicable housing code. No longer would tenants have to somehow draw
the attention of overburdened city officials or “initiate court proceedings in
what may appear to be a ‘frightening’ system.”38
Javins was tremendously influential. By the end of the decade, its
holding became law in a clear majority of states. Courts around the country
adopted the implied warranty of habitability, and state legislatures, acting in
concert with courts or independently of them, codified the warranty.39 Today,
it is part of the law in forty-nine states.40
Given the warranty’s current inclusion in many states’ lawbooks, it is
simplistic—and plainly misleading—to refer to the implied warranty of
habitability as a purely judicial or common law creation. But there is no
debating the leading role that judges took in the warranty’s development and
entrenchment. After all, the doctrine was first introduced through a court
decision. Courts further fortified the protections of the warranty by banning
retaliatory evictions: the eviction of a tenant who had earlier raised a
warranty complaint.41 Through such and similar court decisions (and the
legislative acts they engendered), the warranty became an uncontestable
component of American landlord–tenant law.
That is not to say that the trend in modern law has always, and
unwaveringly, been to expand the warranty’s reach. More recently, certain
reforms have curtailed its effects. Examples include demands that a tenant
raising a claim for breach of the warranty deposit in escrow any rent they
withhold;42 that the tenant alert local officials;43 that the landlord be afforded

37
Cunningham, supra note 31, at 15 (“[A]ll observers agree that local governments have been
notably ineffective in code enforcement.”).
38
See Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 1973) (quoting James H.
Angevine & Gerald Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws—Some New Techniques, 52 MASS. L.Q.
205, 228 (1967)).
39
See Cunningham, supra note 31, at 6–9.
40
Arkansas is the one holdout. See Stephen R. Giles et al., Non-Legislative Commission on the Study
of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 739, 764 (2013) (noting that “[t]he implied
warranty of habitability . . . is now law in every state except for Arkansas”).
41
The leading case was Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42
See, e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.105(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1972);
Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin & David J. Guzik, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making
Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2016).
43
See Dugan v. Milledge, 494 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Conn. 1985).
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enough time to repair defects after receiving notice;44 and that the tenant
prove that subpar conditions were the only reason for withholding rent.45
Even if courts did not introduce all, or even most, of these limiting rules,
courts have done little if anything to push back or narrow the application of
such restrictive legislative demands. In this respect, courts’ dedication to the
doctrine has not been absolute. Furthermore, in their factual findings, courts
are perhaps at times not as pro-tenant as could be hoped for.46 Still, in none
of these instances have courts questioned or unsettled the validity of the
doctrine as a whole.
Courts might not find a breach of the warranty in every case, and they
might not be as committed to aggressively enforcing it as its instigators
would have liked. But courts initiated the attachment of a quality assurance
to rental units—and in the more than fifty intervening years since they
introduced it, they have never questioned that assurance’s doctrinal
grounding.
B. A Strong Judicial “No” to Price Controls
The tale of American law’s regulation of the price tenants are charged
for those units they rent is very different. Unlike the development of the
maintenance-related elements of landlord–tenant law—where the judiciary
often took the lead—tenant-empowering reforms in this realm were almost
all legislative. In fact, courts often resisted these efforts. Because courts’ role
in reversing the most radical of legislative reforms targeting rental units’
pricing is largely unacknowledged, this Section’s discussion will be
somewhat more detailed than the preceding discussion of courts’ wellknown role in establishing maintenance duties.

44
See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J. 1973) (explaining that “a reasonable period
of time to . . . repair” a defect is “a prerequisite to maintaining” an action based in the warranty);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 5.5(4) (AM. L. INST. 1977); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.052(a)(1) (West 2007) (requiring that a tenant specify the condition of the property in a
notice to the landlord before a landlord is obligated to commence repairs).
45
See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
389, 425–26 (2011).
46
E.g., 280 Broad, LLC v. Adams, No. HDSP-137382, 2006 WL 2790909, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 26, 2006) (finding that “the evidence does not support the finding that the Tenant was relieved of
the obligation to pay rent due to the condition of the premises. Although the Tenant was not satisfied with
the Landlord’s efforts to address the furnace issue, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the furnace
problems caused the premises to be rendered unfit an [sic] uninhabitable”); Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d
915, 920 (Ill. 1985) (insisting that “[t]he condition complained of must be such as to truly render the
premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person”).
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1. Legislatures Take the Lead
Given the common law’s original notion of the lease as the conveyance
of an estate—of the right to possess property for a given amount of time—
the law placed no obligation on the landlord to renew the lease.47 At the end
of the lease’s term, a landlord was free to evict the tenant or insist on raising
the rent as he saw fit.48
Twentieth-century legislation altered certain aspects of the landlord’s
termination rights. The most prevalent and long-lasting reform removed the
landlord’s right to resort to self-help to evict a tenant at the end of a lease.
Almost all states now require—mostly by statute—that landlords turn to
courts to remove a tenant who refuses to leave at the end of her lease.49 These
laws only address the procedures that must precede an eviction—they do not
mandate that the landlord provide the tenant with the option of signing a new
lease. A few states have adopted some form of for-cause eviction laws, which
can carry that effect.50 But even under the most far-reaching of these laws,
New Jersey’s 1974 statute, a landlord is allowed to insist on increased rent
in the new lease.51 The only exception that the New Jersey law makes is for
“unconscionable” rent increases.52 While courts there eventually agreed to
place the burden of proving that the increase is not unconscionable on the
landlord,53 they hardly ever rule against landlords on this issue.54 Thus, even
47

Then and now, several types of tenancies existed. Blackstone identified the estate for years—now
known as a term of years—which ends at the expiration of the period fixed, no other notice being required;
tenancy at will, which could be terminated by either party at any time; and the tenancy at sufferance,
which described the status of a tenant who had wrongfully stayed beyond the expiration of her rights.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140–50. A century or so later, another form became popular:
the periodic tenancy, which runs continuously from period to period—say, month to month—until one
party terminates it by giving proper notice, usually equivalent to the length of the measuring period.
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.16 (3d ed. 2000).
48
Indeed, the landlord could even rely on self-help to remove the tenant at the lease’s conclusion.
“The landlord-tenant relationship was one of the few areas where the right to self-help was recognized
by the common law of most States, and the implementation of this right has been fraught with ‘violence
and quarrels and bloodshed.’” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972) (quoting Entelman v. Hagood,
22 S.E. 545, 545 (Ga. 1895)); see also Foley v. Gamester, 170 N.E. 799, 800 (Mass. 1930) (finding that
a landlord who leased to a tenant “for as many years as desired” could terminate at will).
49
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 7, § 6:5, at 400–02. The requirement does not always apply to
commercial tenancies. See, e.g., Brown v. State Cent. Bank, 459 F. Supp. 2d 837, 842 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
50
See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01. A Connecticut law provides some protections to the elderly and
persons with disabilities. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-23c. New Hampshire limits evictions in certain
circumstances. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:1-a, 540:2 (2018).
51
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(f) (West 2013).
52
Id.
53
Fromet Props., Inc. v. Buel, 684 A.2d 83, 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
54
Marine View Hous. Co. No. 1 v. Benoit, 457 A.2d 1241, 1242 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982)
(“[T]o prevail on a defense of unconscionability in a dispossess action the tenant bears the heavy burden

263

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the most extreme version of the legislative reforms limiting the landlord’s
common law right to evict does little to provide a tenant with any price
assurance, or the attendant assurance that she would be able to renew her
lease under its current terms.
A different form of legislative reform has sought to achieve that goal:
rent control. Rent control statutes were first introduced in the United States
as temporary measures by a few cities and states in the World War I era to
deal with the upheaval in urban housing markets wrought by the war
economy.55 Then, during World War II, the federal government reintroduced
rent controls as part of its general price control program.56 These programs
all expired by 1947, with new federal legislation leaving it to states to decide
whether to retain or alter rent control measures.57 In the early 1970s, in order
to deal with what came to be known as “stagflation,” President Nixon issued
executive orders instituting caps on increases in rents (as well as in prices
and salaries) that lasted for several months.58 These federal orders spurred
cities and states to enact a second wave of rent control laws in the mid-tolate 1970s.59
These more recent rent control laws did not bluntly cap rents at below
market rate. Instead, after setting a historical base rate for units, they allowed
annual increases at a limited rate fixed in accordance with some formula.60
Such measures also did not apply to all properties in the underlying
jurisdiction; rather, they only covered a certain portion of the local rental
market.61 Most also allowed landlords, even of covered units, to increase
of proving that a rent increase is ‘monstrously harsh and shocking.’” (quoting Hill Manor Apts. v. Brome,
395 A.2d 1307, 1315 (Essex County Ct. 1978))).
55
See, e.g., Kenneth K. Baar, Rent Control in the 1970’s: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants’
Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1977).
56
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 902(b); see also John W. Willis, A Short
History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 54, 79 (1950) (“By January, 1945, Scranton,
Pennsylvania, was the only city of more than 100,000 population not under control, and there were only
six cities of more than 50,000 population . . . .”).
57
EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO
MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 58–59 (2008).
58
Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (Aug. 15, 1971); Exec. Order No. 11,627, 36 Fed.
Reg. 20,139 (Oct. 16, 1971). The President was exercising powers granted to him by the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201–206, 84 Stat. 796, 799–800 (1970).
59
See Baar, supra note 55, at 640–41.
60
Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS
L. REV. 723, 766–67 (1983). A landlord can also petition for an individual adjustment to assure that he
receives a “fair” return. Id. at 728.
61
See id. at 756–57 (explaining that “ordinances typically exempt units in owner-occupied dwellings
containing less than a specified number of units . . . ; units which are rented primarily to transient guests;
rooming houses; nonprofit facilities, including cooperatives; extended health care facilities; and units
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rents beyond the allowable annual increase when a tenant moved out.62
Indeed, many of the measures deemed a unit “decontrolled” once it became
vacant. At that point, the initial rent for the new tenant was no longer subject
to rent controls.63 Perhaps inevitably, these laws also limited the permissible
grounds for eviction or for nonrenewal of leases.64
Rent control laws thus stand as the major tool in American law limiting
landlords’ ability to increase rent. But this tool has not been faring
particularly well. Starting in the late 1970s, state legislatures moved not only
to abolish state rent control laws, but also to prohibit local governments from
adopting their own rent control ordinances. Louisiana enacted the first such
law in 1977.65 The social transformations of the late 1970s and the 1980s—
the political shift to the right and the fall from academic grace of Keynesian
notions of planned economies—deeply delegitimized price controls and led
to the passage of more such anti-rent-control laws in the 1980s.66 The
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative, probusiness lobbying group, suggested a model rent control preemption law that
multiple states then adopted in the late 1980s and 1990s.67 The tide has turned
so dramatically that at the time of writing, in 2022, rent control is prohibited
in thirty-two states and practiced in only seven—and even in those states,
often only in a handful of cities.68
2. The Judicial Role in Rental Price Regulation
This story of American law’s attempt at regulating the pricing of rental
units is well-established: efforts were introduced, and then mostly
withdrawn, by legislatures. Yet the story contains another layer, which is
constructed after the adoption of the ordinance. . . . Other types of exemptions which have been adopted
include: all dwellings with less than a specified number of units, regardless of whether or not they are
owner-occupied, ‘substantially rehabilitated’ units, ‘luxury’ units, and units which become vacant after a
certain date.”).
62
Vicki Been, Ingrid Goud Ellen & Sophia House, Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the
Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1061 (2019).
63
Baar, supra note 60, at 826.
64
See, e.g., David Shulman, Real Estate Valuation Under Rent Control: The Case of Santa Monica,
9 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N 38, 40 (1981).
65
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:3258 (1977).
66
E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 35.21.830 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-301 (1981); MINN. STAT.
§ 471.9996 (1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-19 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-39-60 (1985).
67
Rent Control Preemption Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Jan. 28, 2013), https://alec.org/modelpolicy/rent-control-preemption-act [https://perma.cc/42ES-XA9A]. The language is used in Michigan’s
law, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 123.411 (1988), South Dakota’s, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 6-1-13 (1990),
Arkansas’s, ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-601 (1993), Tennessee’s, TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-35-102 (1996),
Illinois’s, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 825/5 (1997), and elsewhere.
68
See data collected in Rent Control Laws by State, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL (July 19,
2022), https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state [https://
perma.cc/FLD6-NWUP].
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often overlooked: the role judges played. To date, it has largely been
assumed that judges were mostly passive observers as the tale of rent control
unfolded.69 This account is, as this Section will show, inaccurate, but the
misconception is understandable. Early and consistently, the Supreme Court
rejected all challenges to the constitutionality of rent control laws.70
Landlords have repeatedly argued that when a government enacts these laws
limiting their ability to remove a tenant, it takes their property without paying
them just compensation in violation of the Constitution’s Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court never accepted these claims,
and accordingly it became easy to view American courts as embracing rent
control—and thus as not responsible for the demise of rent control laws.71
However, the traditional focus on federal constitutional litigation—
specifically, the obsession with the Takings Clause—obscures the important
role state law has assumed in combating rent control, or indeed, any policy
aimed at regulating rental units’ pricing. The next Sections examine some
specific tools courts have used to undermine rent control.

69
E.g., Mitch Kahn & Dennis Keatting, Rent Control in the New Millennium, SHELTERFORCE (May
1, 2001), https://shelterforce.org/2001/05/01/rent-control-in-the-new-millennium/ [https://perma.cc/
3QNA-DFGG]. Kahn and Keatting attribute the demise of rent control to landlord trade groups that

lobbied to cut off federal Community Development Block Grant funds to any municipality with
rent control and got the Reagan Administration to push for this sanction each time the program
came up for authorization. [The] organizations [also] encouraged their state affiliates to initiate
local and statewide referenda on rent control and provided research materials, expertise and
guidance for these campaigns. These efforts coincided with a growing conservative and antiregulatory sentiment in many sectors of the voting population.
See also Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 529 (1984) (“To summarize, the courts’ abandonment of the
‘emergency’ requirement has increased the incidence of rent control ordinances. Although there are some
limits on the scope of ordinances that will be upheld, the general judicial trend has been to uphold
ordinances that impose fairly harsh restrictions on landlords.”); Elizabeth Naughton, Comment, San
Francisco’s Owner Move-In Legislation: Rent Control or Out of Control?, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 537, 537
(2000) (“The federal and California judiciaries have long accepted rent control’s basic tenets.”); Brandon
M. Weiss, Progressive Property Theory and Housing Justice Campaigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 251,
272 (2019) (arguing that the state legislature was responsible for decades of “dormancy in the area of rent
control”).
70
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S.
242, 250 (1922); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157–58 (1921).
71
State courts have also mostly upheld rent control laws against constitutional takings challenges,
though some struck down extreme measures that would not allow the landlord to go out of business or
move into the unit herself. E.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062–64 (N.Y.
1989) (striking down as a taking an anti-warehousing ordinance that prohibited landlords of single room
occupancy hotels from going out of business). Still, in Nash v. City of Santa Monica, the Supreme Court
of California upheld a rent control ordinance that blocked a landlord from demolishing her building.
688 P.2d 894, 911 (Cal. 1984).
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a. Implied state preemption of local initiatives
The most effective weapon state courts have wielded against rent
control has been their easy resort to preemption—particularly implied
preemption—when dealing with local rent control ordinances. As noted,
anti-rent-control state laws work to bar local governments (such as cities and
counties) from adopting rent control ordinances. Given that in current
American law local governments are formally subservient, the state
legislature is normally free to preempt their actions in this fashion.72 Thus,
once enacted, state bans on rent control leave little wiggle room for local
governments—and hence little discretion for courts when asked to sanction
a local rent control measure.
However, often in preemption cases the question is not whether the state
has the power to preempt a local action—as noted, it almost always does—
but rather whether it has chosen to exercise that power. In other words, if a
state statute does not clearly ban a given local action, a court must decide
whether the statute should still be read as intending to do so. This concept of
implied preemption leaves it to a court to determine if the relevant state law
blocks the specific local action.
This judicial power has proven disastrous for measures attempting to
regulate the pricing of rental units. Through implied preemption, courts have
undermined local efforts at rent controls in two ways: by finding grounds to
preempt localities from acting even in the absence of a state law expressly
preempting rent control, and once such express laws were adopted, by
interpreting these preempting state laws extremely broadly.
In earlier cases, courts would read laws that did not specifically prohibit
rent control as still preempting local rent control ordinances. In 1957, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey found that when the state legislature allowed
its World War II-era rent control law to expire (while enacting another law
still authorizing rent control) it indicated an intention to preempt a Newark
ordinance adopted under the previous law.73 Two years later, the Connecticut
72

As described by the Supreme Court:

Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. . . . The
number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. . . . The State,
therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation
such property, . . . expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. . . . In all these respects the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will,
unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907).
73
Wagner v. Mayor of Newark, 132 A.2d 794, 801 (N.J. 1957).
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Supreme Court similarly held that the termination of a state rent control
statute expressed the notion that as a “matter of public policy” such measures
were not necessary and thus implied a preemption of local measures.74
Courts would even attribute a preemptive effect to laws that did not
address rent control at all. Maryland’s highest court detected implied
preemption in the state’s general laws dealing with the landlord–tenant
relationship.75 Those laws set procedures for the eviction of tenants holding
over after the expiration of their lease. The contested Baltimore rent control
ordinance prohibited evicting certain tenants and thus, the court argued,
prohibited an action the state law permitted. Even though the state law said
nothing about rent control and did not purport to assure landlords an absolute
right to evict, the law’s mere treatment of eviction sufficed for preemption.76
Nearly two decades later, in 1972, the Supreme Court of Florida similarly
read its state laws dealing with tenancy—specifically, those allowing either
party to terminate a tenancy-at-will and classifying a holdover tenant as a
tenant at sufferance—as preempting Miami Beach’s rent control ordinance.
Though the state law did not ban localities from doing anything, or even
touch upon the pricing of rental units, the court deemed it preempting local
rent control measures.
These rulings relied on an idea of field preemption. They were
grounded in the notion that the state had fully occupied the field of landlord–
tenant regulation. Thus, because rent control inevitably dealt with landlord–
tenant law, any local rent control measure represented an intrusion into this
site of exclusive state regulation.
While such holdings’ effects could be far-reaching, their importance
declined in the ensuing decades. As states’ anti-rent-control legislative
efforts grew more explicit—as reviewed above—courts striking down local
rent control ordinances as preempted no longer needed to read preemptory
intent into neutral state statutes. Courts now exhibited their anti-rent-control
inclinations in preemption cases in a different way: by interpreting the antirent-control state laws in a manner that expanded their reach. Specifically,
courts resorted to an exceptionally broad definition of rent control (the policy
the laws preempted), one that is rather removed from traditional political and
economic understandings of rent control.
Probably most impactful has been many courts’ holdings that
inclusionary zoning measures qualify as rent control—and are thus
74

Old Colony Gardens, Inc. v. City of Stamford, 156 A.2d 515, 517 (Conn. 1959).
Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 107 A.2d 99, 103 (Md. 1954). This postwar court was faced with a
very similar factual setting to those found in New Jersey and Connecticut, yet unlike them it did not view
the repeal of the state rent control law as implying the preemption of local ordinances. Id.
76
Id.
75
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preempted. Inclusionary zoning policies were designed as a counter to
exclusionary zoning: the use of zoning tools, such as minimum lot size
requirements or prohibitions on multiunit dwellings, to prevent the
construction of affordable housing in affluent neighborhoods.77 Inclusionary
zoning programs require or incentivize private developers to price below
market rate a certain percentage of units in a given project they seek to build.
The inclusion of such units can be a condition for a zoning variance or permit
necessary for the development, or it could serve as basis for the award of a
density bonus—an allowance to the developer to increase the size or unit
count of the development beyond existing zoning rules.78 In both policy
motivation and in legal design, therefore, inclusionary zoning (as its name
also implies) lies squarely within the realm of traditional zoning or land use
law.79
With its substantive and formal roots in zoning law, inclusionary zoning
operates very differently from rent control.80 It restricts only certain
developments in the jurisdiction (as opposed to all rental units). It focuses
the restrictions on new developments (as opposed to currently occupied
units). It is imposed as part of a bargain with a developer who voluntarily
agrees to assume the restrictions (as opposed to being a forced regulation).
Still, multiple courts have somehow characterized local inclusionary
zoning measures as rent control and thus held them preempted by anti-rentcontrol state laws.81 Courts in Colorado,82 Wisconsin,83 and California84 all
rejected localities’ claims that inclusionary zoning ordinances could not
logically qualify as rent control. For the California court, a Los Angeles setaside ordinance was still preempted because the anti-rent-control state statute

77
See Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality of Local Inclusionary
Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, 36 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 1 (2013).
78
For a discussion of the mechanics of inclusionary zoning, see Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K.
Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2145, 2154–60 (2017).
79
See, e.g., Nadia I. El Mallakh, Does the Costa-Hawkins Act Prohibit Local Inclusionary Zoning
Programs?, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1847, 1872–74 (2001) (detailing the different rationales and purposes
behind rent control and inclusionary zoning).
80
Id. at 1873–74 (discussing material differences between rent control and inclusionary zoning).
81
The Supreme Court of Virginia took an even more convoluted path to arrive at the same result. It
struck down an ordinance requiring private developers to set aside 15% of housing as low and moderate
income as exceeding the state’s zoning authorization law—which somehow expressed “legislative
intent . . . to permit localities to enact only traditional zoning ordinances directed to physical
characteristics and having the purpose neither to include nor exclude any particular socio-economic
group.” Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1973).
82
Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo. 2000), as modified on
denial of reh’g (June 26, 2000).
83
Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 722 N.W.2d 614, 625 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
84
Palmer/Sixth St. Props. L.P. v. City of Los Angeles, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 886 (Ct. App. 2009).
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established a landlord’s “right to establish the initial rental rates.”85 The
Wisconsin decision was perhaps even blunter: the anti-rent-control state law
preempted any local effort that “regulate[d] the amount of rent that property
owners in . . . specified circumstances may charge for rental dwelling
units.”86
A more recent decision from Illinois, not dealing with inclusionary
zoning, provides a striking illustration of this judicial tendency to read antirent-control laws broadly to encompass any local measure concerning rental
units’ pricing. In spring 2021, an Illinois appellate court struck down a
Chicago ordinance requiring the owner of a foreclosed rental property to pay
a current tenant residing therein a $10,600 relocation fee or renew her lease
at a rate not exceeding 102% of the current rent.87 To bring this ordinance
into the realm of rent control—which a state statute preempts—the court
truly had to exert itself.
First, it had to write off the fact that a landlord could avoid the
ordinance’s specter by paying the relocation fee. Dismissing the city’s
reliance on this attribute of its measure, the court explained:
[T]his reasoning strains logic because under that analysis, no rent control
measure would ever be contrary to the Act because rent control, even as
traditionally understood, does not require a property owner to rent the property.
An owner is always free to decline to rent his property and, as such, avoid any
restrictions on the amount of rent that can be charged.88

Logic is indeed strained here—but by the court’s reasoning rather than
the city’s. Traditional rent control might allow a landlord to refrain from
renting out a regulated unit, but it does not allow her to pay a lump sum (and
a pretty low one at that) to remove a protected tenant and rent out the unit on
the free market.
But this was not the only contrived move the court made in its
unyielding effort to expand the reach of the state’s anti-rent-control statute.
The court could not, and did not, deny the City’s contention that the
challenged measure bore little resemblance to traditional rent control, which
the state legislature had sought to ban. The court simply wrote off this
seemingly highly pertinent fact as irrelevant.89 It explained that whether or
not it resembled rent control as commonly understood or as imagined by the

85
86
87

Id.
Apartment Ass’n, 722 N.W.2d at 625.
Rivera v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 1-19-2188, 2021 WL 1732244, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 30,

2021).
88
89
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Id. (referring to the City’s argument that this is a meaningful distinction as “pure sophistry”).
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state legislature, the measure represented an attempt to “regulate or control”
pricing and was hence preempted.90
The Illinois court’s decision is noteworthy for the purposes of this
Section’s review of American law, not due to its practical result. The specific
measure struck down there, unlike in the inclusionary zoning cases discussed
above, was rather unique. But the decision exemplifies in an extreme manner
the trend seen in the cases dealing with the much more prevalent inclusionary
zoning measures. Courts insist on a reading of anti-rent-control laws that
goes well beyond their background or wording to reach any local price
regulation of housing.91
b. Lack of local authority to initiate
Courts’ enduring animosity toward local attempts at regulating rental
prices also manifests when no allegedly preempting state statute is involved.
From the first widespread introduction of local rent control measures in the
aftermath of World War II to our own days, courts have employed myriad
doctrines to explain why localities simply lack the power to introduce such
measures—even when states do not disallow them. Thereby, courts
independently perform the same task that anti-rent-control statutes perform
when and where they exist.
In American law, as noted, local governments enjoy no inherent
powers.92 Any local action must thus be grounded in some state-level
measure empowering the locality to act. The older and most restrictive
approach, which still applies in some places, is known as Dillon’s Rule.
Dillon’s Rule holds that a city must pinpoint some specific state-level
enabling act as the basis for any action it takes. Under the Rule, therefore,
the city only enjoys powers expressly granted in a state statute, powers
implied or incidental to those granted powers, or powers that are essential.93
The Rule further insists that even if the city can identify a state enabling act,
that enabling act will always be interpreted narrowly.94 A second approach
also exists. In many places, constitutional reforms have overruled Dillon’s
Rule and granted certain cities Home Rule powers. These allow cities to act
90

Id.
Ironically, and tellingly, in the one case where a broad reading of the meaning of rent control
would have aided a city measure, a court rejected that reading. In the case of Tri County Apartment Ass’n
v. City of Mountain View, 242 Cal. Rptr. 438, 443–44 (Ct. App. 1987), the city sought to justify as a rent
control measure its ordinance mandating extended notice before a landlord could increase rent, which it
was empowered to adopt under state laws. The court decided the policy was one pertaining to notification,
not rent control, and hence prohibited. Id.
92
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
93
JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1872).
94
Id. (“Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against
the [municipal] corporation, and the power is denied.”).
91
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even in the absence of a specific enabling act if the matter is deemed to be
“local.”95
Rent control has not fared particularly well under either approach.
Under Dillon’s Rule, several courts found that any city enacting a local rent
control ordinance must identify a state statute specifically authorizing rent
control; the power to adopt such regulations cannot be incidental or
necessary to the grant of another, more general, power.96 Courts also applied
this framework to non-rent-control measures meant to maintain affordable
housing stock, insisting on reading narrowly any potentially relevant
enabling act.97 Consequently, cities’ attempts to characterize state statutes
delegating to them police powers as enabling acts for rent control measures
have mostly failed. A majority of courts have insisted that rent control cannot
be authorized by a state granting a local government general police powers
to promote health, safety, and welfare.98 As the Connecticut Supreme Court
so perspicuously explained: “Rent controls are an exercise of the police
power. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a delegation of police
power in general terms by the state to a municipality includes authority to
impose rent controls.”99 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, although
acknowledging that rent control was authorized as part of a city’s stateenabled police powers, insisted that that was only the case in times of
emergency.100 It then proceeded to determine—with little but its own reading

95

GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD & DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES
174–76 (6th ed. 2015).
96
See, e.g., Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 222 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. 1949) (en banc) (“A city has no
inherent police power. Its authority to exercise such power with a particular field must come from a
specific delegation by the state or in certain cases from the express or fairly implied grant of powers of
its charter.”).
97
Greater Bos. Real Est. Bd. v. City of Boston, 705 N.E.2d 256, 257–58 (Mass. 1999) (striking down
a city’s attempt to protect units in converted buildings, which had relied on an enabling act awarding
certain rights to tenants when buildings are converted).
98
City of Mia. Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804 (Fla. 1972) (“The weight of
authority is that without specific authorization from the state, the cities cannot enact a rent control
ordinance either incident to its specific municipal powers or under its General Welfare provisions.”); see
also Ambassador East, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 77 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ill. 1948) (holding that the police
power does not extend to control of hotel rates), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 15, 1948); Old
Colony Gardens, Inc., v. City of Stamford, 156 A.2d 515, 516 (Conn. 1959) (holding that delegation of
police power does not necessarily convey authority to impose rent controls). But see Inganamort v.
Borough of Ft. Lee, 303 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1973) (holding that the grant of broad police powers enabled
municipalities to adopt a rent control measure).
99
Old Colony Gardens, 156 A.2d at 516 (citations omitted).
100
Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 127 A.2d 703, 705 (Pa. 1956).
AND MATERIALS
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of some statistics to guide it—that Philadelphia’s 3% vacancy rate did not
qualify as a housing emergency warranting rent control.101
Cities’ Home Rule powers have also often proven insufficient in the
eyes of courts to legitimize rent control. Courts have vacillated on the
question of whether rent regulation is a local rather than state concern, and
thus covered by the Home Rule authorization for city “local” initiatives.102
Even when courts deign to deem them “local” enough, rent control efforts
can still fail. One court found that though local, rent controls regulated a
private law relationship (between landlords and tenants) and thus fell under
the “private law” exception to Home Rule powers enumerated in the
constitution of that state (and many others).103 Another court found that rent
control, while a local concern, was also of state concern—it was a measure
of mixed concern—and thus ineligible for Home Rule immunity (which that
state’s constitution provided) from state interference.104
c. Miscellaneous constitutional infirmities
Courts’ heavy reliance on local government law doctrines—
preemption, Dillon’s Rule, police powers, Home Rule105—to undermine
local rent control efforts has been supplemented by sporadic resort to varied
other state constitutional doctrines. Rent control has been struck down
through anti-delegation principles (which allegedly ban cities from
delegating legislative powers to rent control administrators without concrete
guidelines),106 due process requirements (which allegedly mandate a
mechanism to provide effective and prompt adjustment of rents),107

101
Id. at 706; see also City of Mia. Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764, 771 (Fla. 1974)
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The mere inability by a group of tenants to meet
rent payments is not such an emergency as to justify government controls . . . .”).
102
2 POWELL, supra note 18, § 16A.02 (reporting that “[c]ase law is still unsettled in this area”). The
same courts were liable to change their mind on the issue. Compare Wagner v. Mayor of Newark,
132 A.2d 794, 801 (N.J. 1957) (holding that rent control did not fall within a municipality’s Home Rule
powers), with Inganamort, 303 A.2d at 304–05 (holding the opposite, sixteen years later); compare
Fleetwood Hotel, 261 So. 2d at 804 (holding that the Home Rule does not empower local governments
to enact rent control ordinances), with Forte Towers, 305 So. 2d at 766 (holding that, following the
passage of a new law, “municipalities now are empowered to enact [rent control] ordinances”).
103
Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Rev. & Grievance Bd., 260 N.E.2d 200, 204–05 (Mass. 1970).
104
Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 32–33 (Colo. 2000), as modified
on denial of reh’g (June 26, 2000).
105
Specifically, limits to Home Rule initiative powers, the private law exception to those, and the
conditions for Home Rule immunity.
106
Forte Towers, 305 So. 2d at 765.
107
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1030 (Cal. 1976) (“The charter amendment is
constitutionally deficient in that it withholds powers by which the rent control board could adjust
maximum rents without unreasonable delays and instead requires the Board to follow an adjustment
procedure which would make such delays inevitable.”).
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prohibitions on legislation through local referenda,108 and state constitutions’
takings clauses.109
*

*

*

It would be inaccurate to claim that courts are wholly responsible for
the demise of rent control in America. Clearly, a main culprit has been
legislatures (the bodies which also first instigated these measures). However,
it is impossible to deny the marked antipathy American courts have
expressed through the decades toward these measures regulating rental units’
pricing. In a hypothetical world with no anti-rent-control laws, courts’
common refusal to acknowledge local powers to establish rent control would
have defeated those efforts. In our current world, with anti-rent-control laws,
courts enforce these laws with gusto to preempt local measures, consistently
expanding the laws’ reach and often disregarding their original logic.
Counterexamples of course exist,110 but the trend is unmistakable.
Similarly unmistakable is the contrast between this trend and the
judicial attitude toward the regulation of rental units’ quality. Courts did not
wait for legislatures to act when they first undermined rent control (which
legislatures then often proceeded to ban). Courts did not wait for legislatures
to act when they first adopted the warranty of habitability (which legislatures
then often proceeded to codify). Courts employed neutral statutes addressing
the landlord–tenant relationship to strike down rent control but never saw
those laws as inhibiting the warranty of habitability. The same American
courts that embraced rental housing quality regulation have opposed any
form of rental housing price regulation.

108

Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 415 A.2d 255, 262 (Md. 1980).
Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1973); Gregory v. City of
San Juan Capistrano, 191 Cal. Rptr. 47, 58 (Ct. App. 1983); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York,
542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (N.Y. 1989).
110
In one counterexample, an Oregon court found that
109

the legislature did not intend to broadly prohibit any regulation that could tend to have a
restraining effect on rent. Rather, the statute is solely directed at prohibiting local “rent control,”
which the legislature intended to mean the direct regulation of the amount of rent to be paid to a
landlord.
Owen v. City of Portland, 470 P.3d 390, 393–94, 396 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). The court therefore allowed a
local ordinance forcing the payment of relocation assistance to tenants if the tenant terminated a tenancy
after a rent increase of 10% or more. See also Foster v. Britton, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800, 803 (Ct. App.
2015) (finding that state law allowing landlords to change the terms of a lease—i.e., increase rent, with
thirty days’ notice—did not preempt an ordinance prohibiting eviction for violating unilaterally imposed
terms, like rent increases, that were not in the original lease).
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II. COURTS’ ANIMATING CONCERNS:
PUBLIC POLICY REFORM OR THE MEANING OF TENANCY
The preceding Part identified a certain duality in American courts’
attitudes toward low-income rental housing. As the traditional common law
of landlord–tenant was reformed to accommodate modern realities, courts
assumed a leading role in creating—and protecting—a tenant’s right to
receive a unit that met minimum quality standards. At the same time, courts
mostly undermined efforts to protect a tenant’s right that the unit be provided
for a certain price, and that she be assured a right to stay therein. What
explains this judicial choice?
If, as activists in the 1960s hoped and observers thereafter often
contended, courts perceived the law of landlord–tenant as an arena for
combating the plight of the poor,111 courts might have made a rational
decision that one tool (quality controls) promoted low-income tenants’
welfare and the other (price controls) did not. Judges may have intuited (and
then kept in existence to this day) an efficient regime.
To see if that was the case, the academic literature assessing both
policies’ effects on low-income tenants should be reviewed. As the review
in the first Section of this Part will show, the literature does not support the
distinction between quality and price controls that American judges so
clearly endorse. Therefore, the second Section will proceed to advance an
alternative explanation for this distinction instituted in current landlord–
tenant law. That explanation views American courts as mostly uninterested
in promoting equality, or any other general public policies, in their move to
establish a modern view of the tenant in American law. Rather, it argues,
they engaged in a traditional common law exercise seeking a general—and
class-neutral—image of the contemporary tenant.
A. Quality and Price Controls as Public Policy Tools
Almost immediately upon its introduction, the implied warranty of
habitability became a locus for debates among commentators. Those debates
often encapsulated the deep fault lines between the left and the right in legal
academia that materialized in the aftermath of the 1960s. Indeed, if the
warranty of habitability itself was, as noted, very much a child of the 1960s,
the academic debate surrounding it was a wholly 1970s–1980s phenomenon.
111
Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 145, 153 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine [of the implied warranty of habitability] was adopted with the
expectation that it would bring transformative change to the landlord-tenant relationship. Advocates and
scholars believed that the law would level the playing field in eviction cases, compensate for ineffectual
code enforcement systems, and serve as a strong deterrent mechanism against landlord property
neglect.”).
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The warranty became a flashpoint for the much broader battle over the
efficacy of regulatory interventions in markets.
The doctrine of the implied warranty of habitability was swiftly assailed
as an inefficient governmental intrusion into the market for housing.
Freedom of contract assures economic efficiency, while government
intervention defeats it. Constructing what quickly became the “mainstream”
view among writers on housing law, analysts argued that any new duty
placed on landlords, rendering their product more expensive to produce,
must ultimately be paid for by the consumers—the tenants.112 Following the
introduction of the warranty, some substandard rental housing stock would
be upgraded, resulting in increased rents due to added maintenance costs.113
This would force tenants to pay higher rent or give up their units. Other
substandard housing units would be removed from the market by landlords
who determine that required repairs would not be covered by income from
the units—leaving even fewer units available for low-income tenants.114
Consequently, even if in the short term (when a landlord cannot, or simply
does not, increase rents) some tenants might benefit from improved living
conditions, as a class and over time, low-income tenants stand to lose much
more due to the warranty than to gain from it.115 The warranty of habitability
hurts the people it aimed to help.
The warranty’s defenders attempted to counter this mainstream view by
questioning its general applicability. That is, left-leaning commentators
argued (as they did elsewhere at the time and since) that the mainstream view
of the warranty relies on too simplistic a view of markets that presumes that
all markets operate in an identical and efficient way.116 They stressed that the
mainstream view made several assumptions respecting the elasticity of both
the demand and supply curves for low-income housing that could not be
taken for granted in all settings. In some situations, these commentators
112
Edward Rabin was the first to allude to this argument as the mainstream view. See Rabin, supra
note 69, at 558.
113
Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 879, 893 (1975).
114
Id.
115
E.g., id. (describing how the warranty of habitability diminishes housing stock); Chester W.
Hartman, Robert P. Kessler & Richard T. Legates, Municipal Housing Code Enforcement and LowIncome Tenants, 40 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 90, 96 (1974) (describing how the warranty of habitability
fails to ensure safe living conditions); Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman
Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1187–88 (1973) (describing
how increased code enforcement may decrease housing stock).
116
Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1100 (1971); Duncan Kennedy,
The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence,
15 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 485, 485, 519 (1987).
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explained, a landlord might not be able to charge higher rents from tenants—
say, because low-income tenants cannot afford to pay any more (and would
thus move out to board with others).117 Similarly, a landlord might not be
able to leave the market to avoid the warranty—say, because the unit she
owns cannot be shifted to a more upscale (or nonhousing) market.118 Market
conditions could thereby force a landlord to react to the warranty by actually
upgrading units she owns with no attendant costs to tenants. Thus, the
argument goes, in some places and markets, the warranty can help poor
tenants without necessarily hurting them.119 In accordance with this
argument, the warranty is efficient when applied selectively in certain
markets.120
As a theoretical matter, therefore, even the warranty’s academic
supporters did not argue that quality controls will always improve the lot of
low-income tenants. They lent very limited support to across-the-board
adherence to the warranty, although they rejected the mainstream view’s
across-the-board objection to the warranty. Whether viewed as substantial or
not, this disagreement should have been soluble by empirical testing. Yet
empirical studies have been painfully indeterminate. The housing market of
the 1970s was subject to so many upheavals that isolating the alleged effects
of the warranty’s initial introduction on pricing or supply was impossible.121
Later empirical studies into the effects of the warranty on the availability of
affordable housing have been widely inconsistent in their findings.122
Regardless, the more recent empirical work has mostly left behind the grand
debate about the desirability of the warranty. Instead of researching the

117

Ackerman, supra note 116, at 1105.
Id. at 1104.
119
Id. at 1096; Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to
Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194, 1196 (1973) (“Professor Komesar cannot be said to undermine
my essay’s first thesis: that under certain economic conditions, a morally viable code-subsidy-litigation
strategy will significantly ameliorate the conditions of the poor tenant.”); Richard S. Markovits, The
Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some
Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (1976) (arguing that some tenants will benefit
from the warranty); Kennedy, supra note 116, at 486.
120
See also Robin Powers Kinning, Selective Housing Code Enforcement and Low-Income Housing
Policy: Minneapolis Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 170 (1993) (arguing that selective
enforcement of the codes against repeat offenders and symbolically important buildings has a salutary
impact without any significant increase in rents).
121
Rabin, supra note 69, at 577–78.
122
See David Listokin & David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 21, 42 (2005)
(finding that studies on the subject have claimed that building code regulations increase housing costs
anywhere between 1% and 200%); see also Michael A. Brower, Comment, The “Backlash” of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability: Theory vs. Analysis, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 884 (2011) (finding a statistically
significant relationship between the existence of an implied warranty of habitability and increased rent
rates).
118
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warranty’s effects on the pricing or availability of housing, it has focused on
tenants’ ability to actually employ the warranty in eviction proceedings.123
The academic literature, in sum, is very far from providing an absolute,
ringing endorsement of the warranty of habitability as a means to aid tenants.
Empirical research is limited and indeterminate, while the theoretical
literature—which thrived in the 1970s and then mostly died off—is at best
mixed in its endorsement. Even those who dissent from the mainstream
critical view of the warranty only argue that the warranty is salutary in some
situations.
The picture is largely identical as far as the literature dealing with rent
control is concerned. Here, economists, rather than legal scholars, have
produced most of the research. Reflecting the rejection of price controls in
the aftermath of the stagflation of the early 1970s,124 the consensus among
American economists is that rent control measures are inefficient.125 They
argue that by limiting the return on rental units, such measures disincentivize
landlords from leasing or improving units.126 Rent controls thus depress
supply.127 They also distort the spending and location decisions of existing
tenants, further reducing supply.128
Several recent studies generate slightly more nuanced conclusions.
Some argue that unlike the traditional cap-based rent control laws, the more
finely tuned rent control measures adopted since the 1970s can be efficient
in certain markets.129 These scholars stress that no rigorous empirical
123

The most illuminating of these articles is Summers, supra note 111, at 174.
Ben Casselman & Jeanna Smialek, Price Controls Set Off Heated Debate as History Gets a
Second Look, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/business/economy/
inflation-price-controls.html [https://perma.cc/BZ6G-C5EA].
125
A poll of economists at top American universities conducted in 2012 found that 81% of
economists believed that rent control did not have a positive impact over the past three decades on the
amount and quality of affordable rental housing in cities that have used them. Rent Control, CHI. BOOTH
INITIATIVE ON GLOB. MKTS. (Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control/
[https://perma.cc/LQT6-D82J].
126
See, e.g., Richard Arnott & Elizaveta Shevyakhova, Tenancy Rent Control and Credible
Commitment in Maintenance, 47 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 72, 82 (2014) (“[T]enancy rent control will
indeed lead to the reduction and postponement of maintenance within a tenancy.”).
127
Rabin, supra note 69, at 581. One commentator even argued that rent control is responsible for
homelessness. William Tucker, Where Do the Homeless Come From?, NAT’L REV., Sept. 25, 1987, at
32, 41. This study, however, was heavily criticized. E.g., John M. Quigley, Does Rent Control Cause
Homelessness? Taking the Claim Seriously, 9 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 89 (1990) (responding to
Tucker’s findings).
128
By depressing the price of living space, rent control encourages tenants to use more space than
they otherwise would. They thus generate waste. Rabin, supra note 69, at 581–82.
129
E.g., Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J. ECON. PERSPS. 99, 108 (1995)
(explaining the efficiency-based argument for second-generation rent controls); TOM SLATER, SHAKING
124
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literature currently exists supporting the contentions of those many authors
who generalize and argue that all rent control measures are
counterproductive.130 Studies focusing on European cities (where rent control
is still more of a reality than in the United States) found that the detrimental
effects of rent control in its modern form might be exaggerated. For example,
one study determined that in a city that had adopted rent control, rents in
noncontrolled areas did not meaningfully increase.131 Another concluded that
rent control’s most problematic impact was the spatial misallocation of
tenants (who chose to stay in controlled units even when jobs were
elsewhere) and noted that these costs could be addressed through other
policies, such as improvements to a city’s public transit system.132
Still, indisputably, the literature remains largely hostile to rent
control.133 Yet it is striking that this skeptical attitude is not markedly
different from that identified when quality controls were reviewed. In both
cases, the literature is largely doubtful of the policy’s beneficial impact, at
most conceding that the policy might attain the desirable results of protecting
low-income tenants in very specific, well-defined circumstances.134
Furthermore, little in the economics-grounded opposition to price controls in
the market for rental housing entails support for quality controls in that
market (other than for quality controls addressing latent defects).135 Whereas
courts have chosen to treat the measures very differently, nothing in the
literature breeds the inference that the warranty of habitability benefits lowUP THE CITY: IGNORANCE, INEQUALITY, AND THE URBAN QUESTION 101–03 (2021) (describing flaws in
the “efficiency myth” associated with traditional rent control measures). But see Kaushik Basu & Patrick
M. Emerson, The Economics of Tenancy Rent Control, 110 ECON. J. 939, 958 (2000) (arguing that at least
some of the more modern forms of rent control are still inefficient).
130
Been et al., supra note 62, at 1076–77.
131
Morten Skak & Gintautas Bloze, Rent Control and Misallocation, 50 URB. STUD. 1988, 2003
(2013) (discussing Denmark).
132
Guillaume Chapelle, Etienne Wasmer & Pierre-Henri Bono, Spatial Misallocation and Rent
Controls, 109 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 389, 392 (2019) (discussing Paris). On how rent control has
detrimentally affected spatial decisions, see generally Are Oust, The Removal of Rent Control and Its
Impact on Search and Mismatching Costs: Evidence from Oslo, 18 INT’L J. HOUS. POL’Y 433 (2018)
(discussing Norway).
133
See, e.g., Rebecca Diamond, Tim McQuade & Franklin Qian, The Effects of Rent Control
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco, 119 AM. ECON. REV.
3365, 3393 (2019) (“If society desires to provide social insurance against rent increases, it may be less
distortionary to offer this subsidy in the form of government subsidies or tax credits.”).
134
See Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 1855 (1988) (concluding that rent control can serve as an effective partial
solution to displacement of low-income tenants in a gentrifying housing market); Nadav Shoked, The
Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 759, 810 (2011) (“Rent control is
probably the only tool that can effectively help tenants stay in a gentrifying community.”).
135
See, e.g., Basu & Emerson, supra note 129, at 959–60 (advocating for “free contracting in the
rental housing market”).
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income tenants more effectively than do rent controls. The clear demarcation
courts have drawn between the two policies finds little support in research
respecting the policies’ efficacy in improving the lot of low-income tenants.
B. Quality and Price Controls and a Legal Image of Tenancy
In light of the foregoing review of the academic literature, judges’
opposite attitudes toward the warranty of habitability and rent control—
supporting the former, objecting to the latter—are not justifiable if the policy
goal those judges had in mind was helping tenants, particularly poor tenants.
But what if that were never the goal? This concluding Section of the Essay
provides some support for that proposition. It explains that courts’ embrace
of the warranty of habitability was grounded in a general view of the
common law meaning of tenancy, rather than in redistributive (or even
efficiency) concerns. Accordingly, that embrace does not stand in conflict
with the courts’ rejection of rent control.
The common perception of the revolution in landlord–tenant law—and
of the warranty of habitability that registers as its greatest achievement—has
come to attribute it, as noted, to judges’ desires to address 1960s-era
concerns about poor tenants’ plight.136 This impression is perhaps inevitable,
as the judicial move followed years of agitation by activists dedicated to
aiding the poor.137 The towering figure of Judge Skelly-Wright, who authored
the Javins decision famously adopting the doctrine, also clearly colors our
understanding and memory of the doctrine. Skelly-Wright was, and remains,
one of the great liberal judges in American history, whose willingness to
employ the law—and innovate the law—to address problems of inequality
and poverty was manifest. In later pronouncements, he made no secret of the
public policy concerns that animated him when deciding Javins:
I was . . . influenced by the fact that, during the nationwide racial turmoil of the
sixties and the unrest caused by the injustice of racially selective service in
Vietnam, most of the tenants in Washington, D.C. slums were poor and black
and most of the landlords were rich and white. There is no doubt in my mind
that these conditions played a subconscious role in influencing my landlord and
tenant decisions.
I came to Washington in April 1962 after being born and raised in New Orleans,
Louisiana for 51 years. . . . It was my first exposure to landlord and tenant
cases . . . . I didn’t like what I saw, and I did what I could to ameliorate, if not

136
See also Meyers, supra note 113, at 882 (attributing the change in law to “the moral principle of
redistribution of wealth from landlord to tenant”).
137
See supra note 17.
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eliminate, the injustice involved in the way many of the poor were required to
live in the nation’s capital.
I offer no apology for not following more closely the legal precedents which
had cooperated in creating the conditions that I found unjust.138

Such statements provided fodder to the 1970s right-wing writers who
were already revolting at what they perceived as the Warren Court’s earlier
excesses. Cast in this light, the Javins decision and its progeny could easily
be portrayed as judicial activism.139 On that view, the warranty was the
product of 1960s liberal judges legislating their progressive agenda from the
bench. Even a commentator who concluded that the “revolution” in
landlord–tenant law was not that revolutionary, but was rather the
culmination of longstanding trends that had already transformed private law
generally over the century, reckoned that underlying the changes was the
“idea that shelter is a basic human necessity, and that public regulation of the
terms and conditions on which it is offered and held is therefore
appropriate.”140 For both its avid champions and avowed enemies, the
warranty materialized as the quintessential example of a judicial attempt to
change society.
Yet the process whereby the doctrine entered American law often belied
this notion. More often than not, the actual court decisions announcing the
warranty did not indicate that lofty goals of battling inequality were the
guiding light.141 The desire to redistribute power, which drove much of the
fight for tenants’ rights, was underrepresented in judicial opinions.142 Those
were instead grounded in much more traditional common law
considerations.
The most common rationale courts, including the Javins court, provided
for their decision to recognize the warranty related to the parties’—and
especially, the tenants’—expectations. Courts reasoned that modern
tenants—unlike their ancient predecessors—viewed themselves as renting
houses rather than land.143 These tenants thus desired and assumed that the
house they received from the landlord continuously meet minimal standards.
138
Rabin, supra note 69, at 549 (quoting Letter from J. Skelly Wright, J., U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the
D.C. Cir., to Edward H. Rabin, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Davis Sch. of L. (Oct. 14, 1982)).
139
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 31, at 75.
140
Glendon, supra note 3, at 504–05.
141
One of the earliest cases gesturing at a warranty did not even mention issues of inequality or
bargaining power. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (Haw. 1969). The same was true elsewhere. See
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 213–17 (Ill. 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 307–09
(Kan. 1974); Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 19–20 (N.J. 1973).
142
Super, supra note 45, at 402.
143
Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075, 1078–79 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Berzito,
308 A.2d at 21.
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The warranty of habitability reflected these assumptions and thus merely
built on existing common law precepts. Many courts cited the old doctrine
that subjected furnished dwellings to a warranty of fitness:
One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and
appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference
to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important
part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay, and
without the expense of preparing it for use.144

That expectation, courts now argued, in current times informed all
tenants—not just those renting furnished units.145 Furthermore, as modern
housing units were not the simple structures of old, the landlord knew much
more than the tenant about construction conditions and about the state of the
house’s mechanical conditions.146 Unlike tenants of yore, tenants thus were
now expecting the landlord to maintain the unit’s many, and vital,
amenities.147
And when individual parties’ expectations were not enough to explain
the judicial insertion of the warranty into leases (say, in cases where one
could argue that tenants were aware of the substandard conditions when they
leased the unit), courts would cite the existence of legislative mandates in
the form of building and housing codes.148 Courts were enforcing a policy of
the legislature.149 Just as important, they claimed that the parties must be
presumed to have been aware of the statutory demands which therefore
formed part of their own agreement.150
Even when judges did reference policy concerns about inequality in
these decisions, they mostly refrained from focusing specifically on poor
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tenants.151 Rather, they stressed the gap in bargaining power between
tenants—all tenants—and landlords.152
This point is key. Courts wrote about the standing of a tenant qua tenant,
not about the standing of poor tenants specifically. They introduced a policy
that was grounded in the standing of tenants—all tenants. In the decisions
they authored, judges described the modern tenant and the difficulties she
might face, not necessarily the poor (let alone minority) tenant.153 Indeed, the
doctrine of the implied warranty was at times first introduced to protect
commercial tenants,154 in other places it followed the introduction of
warranties protecting buyers of new homes,155 and still elsewhere it was
inspired by the trend in the law of implying warranties of fitness and
merchantability into contracts for sales of chattels.156 The doctrine thus built
on other doctrines that had little to do with poor tenants—or any other poor
individuals.
Of course, the decisions implying a warranty of habitability into leases
were likely to be, and inevitably were, of much greater meaning for poor
tenants (who were and are likelier to lack the means to negotiate for such
warranties). But the decisions did not create any special rules for those
tenants. Rich and poor, white and Black, in upscale neighborhoods or in the
“ghetto,” all tenants enjoyed this new right to insist on habitable units.
Once it becomes clear that courts were focused on the position of all
tenants when justifying the warranty of habitability, and that they viewed it
as a common law construct, their decisions supporting the doctrine are much
more in line with the rent control decisions. Rent control, unlike the warranty
of habitability, is clearly a special rule applicable to certain, weaker, tenants.
Not all tenants everywhere are eligible for its protections. It is, explicitly and
undeniably, a redistributive tool. Furthermore, the tool is administrative, not
151
Even a court that was specifically concerned with the weak position of poor tenants—who might
endure unhealthy living conditions—was just as concerned with the effects of their suffering on
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judicial. Unlike the warranty, which relies on traditional court-centric
contract enforcement litigation, rent control standards are defined and
enforced by administrative boards (which set allowable rent levels). Cases
striking down rent control measures due to anti-delegation or due process
concerns157 expressed courts’ unease with this attribute of the policy. Rent
control cannot easily be grounded in parties’ expectations or in any other
traditional common law property or contract concerns. Hence, courts could
not readily accept rent control.
When they were promoting the warranty of habitability, as when they
were sabotaging rent control, courts were, to a great extent, engaged in a
traditional common law practice. They were adjusting existing doctrines as
the underlying realities allegedly informing those doctrines—parties’
expectations or the legislature’s policies—were shifting.
Courts were, in other words, employing and updating the common
law’s idea of what it legally means to be a tenant. This idea they promoted
was, perhaps inevitably, informed by an image of a tenant they had in mind.
To be able to extract the alleged expectations of a current tenant—the
expectations that, as noted, justified the new warranty of habitability—courts
must imagine a certain tenant. In their opinions, judges were depicting the
tenant they imagined and the needs that model tenant had. They were
thinking of the modern tenant and what she needed—not necessarily a poor
tenant and her needs. Their image of a tenant was a general, seemingly classand race-neutral one.
This concept of image as used here draws on the work of political
scientists on imaginaries. The claim is that “shared practices—political,
social, economic—are enabled by way of a collective imagining concerning
their purpose and significance.”158 Charles Taylor famously expounded on
how modern social imaginaries (for example, the imaginary of the market)
facilitated the rise of Western modernity and individuals’ understanding of
their experiences and roles within the social system.159 Alice Kessler-Harris
introduced the notion of the “gendered imagination,” which frames social
organizations and influences what people conceive as feasible and fair.160
157
158
159
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Taylor defined social imaginaries as
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Specifically in the context of property law, I have argued elsewhere that
at any given time a certain image of the owner—the quintessential owner—
affects all property thinking and then generates specific legal rules to sustain
it. As that image changes over time—say, from the image of the yeoman
owner to that of the suburbanite owner—property rules change as well.161
Those images of property, of owners, and of tenants affect all facets of
thinking about a specific legal field. They inform the notions all members of
society—including, inevitably, judges—hold respecting what is necessary
and fair in social interactions. Inevitably, these images oversimplify. They
govern all who fall into the category they regulate, irrespective of those
individuals’ specific needs and preferences. Indeed, the images’ appeal is
that they can be imagined as neutral and as inclusive. They are thus bound
to be, in a sense, conservative, as they reflect hegemonic notions and are not
primarily concerned with the weaker members of society who have special
needs or do not perfectly fit into the reigning ideal.
To the extent landlord–tenant law experienced a revolution, that
revolution was grounded in the shift from one image of tenancy to another.
The revolution operationalized a new image that reflected the modern city
dweller. It was the image of the tenant as a consumer, the consumer of an
urban housing unit. In this image the tenant occupied a unit that was often
attached to other units, and which was useless unless benefitting from certain
well-operating amenities (plumbing, electricity, heating, etc.). A certain unit
was imagined, not a certain price. Thus the image entailed certain assurances
of quality—which all tenants, irrespective of their social status, could
theoretically enjoy—but no assurances respecting pricing—which, in the
capitalist urban system, was to be governed by the market. The tenant was
now conceived as a consumer, and modern consumer protection laws shield
consumers from defective products. They do not set prices or explicitly
redistribute wealth to consumers.
Activists and academic observers might have imagined—might have
desired—that the new landlord–tenant laws would work to redistribute
resources to the poor. The new laws probably, even if to a limited extent,
have. But that was merely a side effect. In crafting these doctrines, courts
were concerned with what—to their minds—it legally means to be a tenant,
not necessarily with doing whatever was needed to help poor tenants.
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CONCLUSION
A review of the state of American landlord–tenant law as it emerged
from its alleged revolution brings to mind a quip: “We don’t answer our
questions, we get over them.” Consistently, in the decades following the
revolution, American courts have retained quality controls for rental units—
the warranty of habitability—but rejected price controls—rent control. After
vigorously debating the merits of those original decisions, particularly those
establishing the warranty of habitability, most of the legal literature in the
field has moved on. Most legal actors have, to one extent or another, settled
on, or come to terms with, a meaning attributed to tenancy in current law: a
tenant is entitled to be assured that her unit abide by certain quality standards,
but is not entitled to get, or keep, that unit for a certain price.
This result illustrates courts’ lack of enthusiasm—if not flat-out
refusal—to engage in class-based redistribution when setting property rules
or settling property disputes. This observation is relevant today as activists
pin ever-greater hopes on courts. Courts are now being asked to sanction
corporate malfeasance, promote environmental justice, remedy the plight of
the homeless, and more. Yet unfortunately, throughout American history,
and as the rent control cases illustrate, courts have much more often
undermined efforts at battling economic inequality than promoted them.
The common law of property is a poor vehicle for fixing economic ills,
and we should not expect judges to reshape housing markets. Even when
promulgating an alleged revolution in landlord–tenant law, judges were
anything but true revolutionaries.
Dramatic change to the distribution of wealth, if it is to come, must
originate in our governments. Seeking such change, some state and city
governments have recently begun experimenting with reforms to property
laws; in a handful of places, they have even reintroduced rent control. These
governments—reflecting the preferences of their constituents—can be
agents of change. The best courts can do is not stand in their way.162
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In a very recent case, a California appeals court did just that, as it found that an anti-rent-control
state law did not preempt San Francisco’s ordinance barring a landlord from imposing a bad-faith rent
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